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Abstract
The initially high performance of a socioeconomic organization is
quite often subject to gradual erosion over time. We present a simple
model which captures such a phenomenon. We assume that play-
ers are partly motivated by certain psychological factors, norms and
morale, and they are willing to exert extra eﬀort if others do so. This
results in a ”continuum” of equilibrium eﬀort levels, whose minimum
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium with respect to the material in-
centives. We show that repeated random shocks induce the erosion of
equilibrium eﬀort levels, but they do not completely decay; in the long
run a certain range of eﬀorts are sustainable. Our model shows that
diﬀerent organizations typically enjoy diverse norms and morale, which
persist for a long time, in the vicinity of the equilibrium determined
by material incentives.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: A12, A13, C70, C72, C73, C91, C92,
D63, D64, H41.
∗This is the text for the 2002 JEA-Nakahara Prize Lecture, delivered at the Fall meeting
of the Japanese Economic Association at the University of Hiroshima on 13-14 October
2002.
†E-mail: kandori@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp. Tel: +81 3 5841 5657. Fax: +81 3 5841 5521.
The author is grateful to J. Hofbauer, W. Sandholm, H. Imai, T. Kikutani, A. Okada, T.
Sekiguchi, T. Shichijo, H. Suehiro, the seminar participants at the University of Kyoto,
D. Shimizu and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and discussion. Financial
supports from CIRJE at the University of Tokyo and the Japan Economic Research Foun-
dation are also gratefully acknowledged.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The initially high performance of a socioeconomic organization is quite often
subject to gradual erosion over time. The waiting time to obtain referee’s
reports for professional journals has been ever increasing (at least in eco-
nomics1), and a class tends to start later as a semester progresses2.I n
the experimental studies of the voluntary contributions to public goods, it
has been repeatedly observed that contributions gradually decay over time.
In the present paper, we construct a simple model which captures such a
phenomenon. Our theory attributes the dynamics to certain psychological
factors, which might be phrased as norms and morale. An organization
may initially enjoy good performance due to high morale and eﬀective work
norms. Those psychological factors have reciprocal nature in the sense that
one is able to maintain high morale and observe norms if others do so. How-
ever, one’s behavior is usually subject to random shocks, and as a result the
initial morale and norms are upset in due course. We show that a gradual
erosion of morale and norms results through the interplay of material (pe-
cuniary) incentives and the eﬀectiveness of the psychological factors, under
perpetual random shocks. An interesting question is whether morale and
norms completely decay so that only material incentives matter in the long
run. Our model predicts that this is not the case, and it shows that a cer-
tain range of morale and norms are sustainable in the long run. Hence our
model shows that organizations enjoy diverse norms and morale, which per-
sist for a long time, in the vicinity of the equilibrium determined by material
incentives. Our model thus sheds light on the eﬀectiveness, limitations, and
diversity of norms and morale in resource allocation problems.
There could be an alternative explanation for the decay of performance
in an organization, which is based on learning. The learning explanation
maintains that agents are not fully aware of material incentives in the short
run, but they gradually learn to behave as homo economicus: In the long
run, they play the equilibrium determined by the material incentives. While
learning is undeniably an important element in the dynamics of performance,
there are some evidences contradicting such an explanation. In the public
goods experiments where no contribution is the dominant strategy, a stylized
fact is that contributions decay over time but non-negligible contributions
remain even in the long run (Dawes and Thaler [6], Isaac, McCue, and Plott
[13] and Isaac, Walker, and Williams [14]). A particularly revealing result is
1Ellison [8] and [9]. See Section 5 and footnote 16 for more detailed discussion.
2At least in my experience.
2reported by Andreoni [4], who let subjects play the voluntary contributions
game ten rounds. The average contribution declined from 19.9 to 5.3 (zero
contribution is dominant). After the tenth round, the subjects are unex-
pectedly told to repeat the same experiment again. In the ﬁrst round of
the new experiment, the average shot back to 19.7. This indicates that the
subjects are aware of material incentives, but there are non-material (i.e.,
psychological) factors which determine their behavior3.
What could be the nature of the relevant psychological factors? In the
growing literature on psychology and economics (or behavioral economics),
basically three diﬀerent formulations have been proposed. One is called
pure altruism,w h i c hs p e c i ﬁes that one’s utility is a weighed sum of her
own and others’ payoﬀs. Another formulation is referred to as warm glow,
which assumes that cooperative behavior per se provides positive utility.
The third formulation is what Rabin [19] called reciprocal altruism,w h i c h
is based on the idea that one is inclined to be nice to those who are nice to
himself4. The decay of morale and norms are most naturally captured by
this formulation, as we will see. Rabin [18] demonstrated a way to superim-
pose reciprocal altruism to material payoﬀsf o r2×2 games, building on the
notion of psychological games proposed by Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stac-
chetti [12]. Levine [16] provided an alternative formulation, where attitude
towards other players is treated as a given but privately known parameter.
Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull [17] presented a model of social welfare ben-
eﬁts in which the embarrassment to live oﬀ aw e l f a r eb e n e ﬁt is a decreasing
function of the number of people on the beneﬁt. Reciprocal altruism often
produces multiple equilibra (mutually nice and mutually hostile ones, for
example), but none of those papers address the dynamics of psychological
factors to examine the relative stability and sustainability of multiple psy-
chological equilibria. The purpose of the present paper is to complement
those works with an explicit model of dynamics.
Let us now sketch the structure of our model. We look at a ”social
dilemma” situation, where the dominant strategy is Pareto ineﬃcient. The
3T h e r ea r es o m ed i ﬀerences between our model and the public goods experiments. In
the majority of experiments, material payoﬀs are linear in contributions, and individual
contributions are not disclosed to the subjects. Those conditions are not met in our
model. Also our model does not formally show how the initial norm of a (new) experiment
is determined. Our purpose here is to present a simple model to capture the erosion of
performance, and we believe that the basic logic and technique in this paper provide some
insights into the experimental results. Constructing a model that closely reproduces the
experimental results is an important future research adgenda.
4See also Fehr and Schmidt [10] for an important alternative formulation where one
cares his own payoﬀ relative to others.
3strategy of a player is interpreted as his eﬀort level, and it takes on a number
of values. In addition to the material payoﬀs, we introduce psychological
payoﬀs, parametrized by two factors, a norm and its binding power. A
norm is the eﬀort level that people expect themselves to exert, and a player
suﬀers from a negative payoﬀ if his eﬀort falls short of the norm. The
magnitude of the negative payoﬀ, which we call the binding power of the
norm, is the greater, the closer they follow the norm. Once such eﬀects are
introduced, the prisoner’s dilemma like situation turns into a coordination
game, as Rabin [18][19] stresses, and this is the ﬁrst essential ingredient of
our model. Depending on the relative strength of the material and psy-
chological payoﬀs, the maximum equilibrium eﬀort level is determined, and
there are ”continuum” of equilibrium eﬀort levels, whose minimum corre-
sponds to the Nash equilibrium with respect to the material payoﬀs. This
is the second essential ingredient.
Now observe that each equilibrium is strict in the sense that a unilat-
eral deviation strictly reduces one’s payoﬀ. Hence traditional equilibrium
reﬁnements concepts are ineﬀective to discriminate them, but the stochas-
tic evolutionary game models proposed by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob [15]
and Young [24] can be fruitfully applied to address the dynamic stability
of equilibria. We will show that, due to random shocks, the system moves
from equilibria with higher eﬀorts to the ones with lower eﬀorts. This is
the third ingredient of our approach. Ellison [7] noted that the stochastic
evolutionary models are particularly relevant in the case where the long run
stochastically stable outcome is achieved via a series of small steps between
intermediate steady states, as the waiting time to see the stochastic evolu-
tion eﬀects can be realistically short. The kind of psychological factors we
consider exactly produce such a game, a coordination game where the stable
outcomes are achieved through ”step-by-step” evolution over a ”continuum”
of equilibria.
2 The Social Dilemma with Norms and Morale
We consider an N-player version of the prisoner’s dilemma game aﬀected by




ej − c(ei) − k[m − ei]+,( 1 )
where ei ∈ {0,1,2,...,L} represents player i’s eﬀort level, e =( e1,...,e N) is
an eﬀort proﬁle, c is the cost of eﬀort, and [x]+denotes max{x,0}.A s t h e
4eﬀort level is discrete, deﬁne (downward) marginal cost of eﬀort level for
e =1 ,2,...,Lby
∆c(e) ≡ c(e) − c(e − 1),
and assume that it is positive and strictly increasing. This is the marginal
beneﬁt of reducing eﬀort, and it plays a crucial role in what follows. The ﬁrst
two terms of the right hand side of (1) captures the material (or pecuniary)
payoﬀ, and the last term represents the psychological payoﬀ.O n e o f t h e
elements that determine the latter is m, which represents a norm among the
workers. It can be thought as the acceptable level of eﬀort, or the eﬀort level
that the players think they should exert. The player suﬀers from negative
psychological cost if his eﬀort level falls short of m. Parameter k denotes
the strength of the psychological cost (or the binding power of the norm).
We assume that in the equilibrium or the steady state,








where K(·) is a non-negative decreasing function5.F o r s i m p l i c i t y , w e a s s u m e
that the number of players is odd, so that there is a player whose eﬀort level
coincides with the median. One may interpret that (m,k) represents the
morale of the players, where a norm m close to the eﬃcient action and a
strong binding power k correspond to high morale6.
A couple of comments are in order about the above speciﬁcation. We
will consider the dynamic process where the norm m evolves over time,
according to the actual eﬀort levels taken by the players. A simplest for-
mulation is that the norm at time t is determined by the eﬀort levels at
t − 1. We may possibly use the average of the eﬀort levels, but this suf-
fers from some drawbacks. For example, if the eﬀort proﬁle (e1,...,e N)
changes from (10,10,...,10) to (3,10,10,...,10), the norm would immedi-
ately fall from 10 if the norm were deﬁned as the average. It would be
more natural, however, to suppose that the norm remains to be 10 and the
5In the present formulation, the binding power of the norm is aﬀected only when
players’ eﬀorts fall short of the norm. One may also assume that the binding power
increases when some of the players exert higher levels of eﬀort than the norm. Our
analysis below is unaﬀected by such reformulation.
6The players may well enjoy satisfaction of high morale per se. To capture this eﬀect,
we may add to each player’s utility a term h(m,k), which is an increasing function of k
and maximized, for any given level of k,w h e nm is equal to the eﬃcient eﬀort level. Our
analysis is unaﬀected by such reformulation.
5d e v i a t i o nb yt h eﬁrst player reduces the credibility of the norm. Our formu-
lation captures such a mechanism; under our formulation, the norm remains
m =1 0but the binding power of the norm k decreases. Also consider the
case e =( 0 ,0,2,7,7,8,8,8,9,9,10). It would be more natural to recog-
nize the cluster between 7 and 10 and expect the norm to be somewhere
in the cluster. Our use of median is in line with this observation, deriving
m =8 . In contrast, the average fails to recognize the cluster and provides
m =6 .1.B y d e ﬁnition, median always chooses an eﬀort level in a cluster
if a majority of the players are in the cluster7. Note that the average and
the median minimize8 PN
i=1(x−ei)2 and
PN
i=1 |x − ei| respectively, so that
the latter places less weights on ”outliers”. To see another property of
median, consider a change from (1,5,5,5,10) to (1,5,2,5,10). The median
remains unchanged. Unlike the average, the median is generally insensitive
to any single player’s eﬀort, if there is a tight cluster of eﬀort levels followed
by a majority of players. Hence it captures the inertia of the norm in a
simplest possible way. Finally, the median is always in the strategy space
{0,1,...,L} (under our assumption of odd number of players) and make our
analysis transparent.
Deﬁnition 1 Eﬀort proﬁle e∗ is a morale equilibrium if













This is somewhat diﬀerent from the standard deﬁnition of Nash equi-
librium of the game where i’s payoﬀ is given by Ui(e)=ui(e,k(e),m(e)).
In our deﬁnition, each player takes k and m given when assessing the gain
from deviation. The parameters m and k, the norm and its binding power,
are psychological factors reﬂecting mutual expectations of players, which
are given at each moment (see the dynamics below for further motivation).
7This is true whatever the deﬁnition of cluster is, as long as it is a connected set of
eﬀort levels (i.e., as long as the cluster consists of all eﬀort levels between e
0 and e”,f o r
some e
0 <e ”.)
8This is seen as follows. Let x 6= e1,...,eN and let n be the number of players whose
eﬀorts are below x. Denote the sum of the absolute value of the errors by E.T h e nw e
have dE/dx = n − (N − n).H e n c e E is decreasing until x hits the median and then it
increases.
6The second and third conditions represent the self-conﬁrming nature of those
psychological factors. The parametric treatment of the psychological fac-
tors is similar in spirit to the formulation of the psychological games of
Geanakoplos et. al. [12] and the fairness equilibrium of Rabin [18]. Before
characterizing the morale equilibria, let us introduce a simplifying assump-
tion to deal with the discreteness of eﬀort level. As the utility function ui
is strictly concave in ei, there would be a unique maximizer for ui,i ft h e
eﬀorts were continuous. Similarly, there would be a unique eﬀort proﬁle
maximizing
P
i ui.W h e n e ﬀorts are discrete, however, there may be two
maximizers adjacent to the ”true” maximizer in the continuous formulation.
As this causes inessential complication in exposition, we exclude such a case.
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions are the following.
Assumption: The cost function c is chosen generically so that ∆c(e)
is not equal to 1, N,o r1+K(
PN
i=1[m − ei]+) for any e,e1,...,e N,m ∈
{0,1,...,L}.
Proposition 1 All morale equilibria are symmetric and the set of morale
equilibrium eﬀort levels is E ≡ {e| em ≤ e ≤ e},w h e r eem is the Nash
equilibrium with the material payoﬀ, which is determined by
∆c(em) < 1 < ∆c(em +1 ) (2)
and e is given by
∆c(e) < 1+K(0) < ∆c(e +1 ) . (3)
Proof. Any morale equilibrium is symmetric because for given k and
m,e a c hp l a y e ri maximizes the same function
v(ei) ≡ ei − c(ei) − k[m − ei]+.( 4 )
Hence in any morale equilibrium m = e∗ and k = K(0),w h e r ee∗ is the
symmetric eﬀort level. As v is concave, e∗ is an morale equilibrium eﬀort
level if the local incentive constraints v(e∗−1) <v (e∗) and v(e∗) >v (e∗+1)
are satisﬁed. They are expressed respectively as
∆c(e∗) < 1+K(0) and (5)
1 < ∆c(e∗ +1 ) .( 6 )
Condition (2) identiﬁes the smallest e∗ to satisfy the latter, while (3) provides
the largest e∗ to satisfy the former.
7Figure 1 shows a typical morale equilibrium e0 and how the material
Nash equilibrium em and the maximum morale equilibrium e are determined.
For expositional simplicity, we ignore in the Figure the discreteness of eﬀort
and treat it as if it were a continuous variable. Note that the heavy line
represents the marginal cost of reducing eﬀort, while c0 (corresponding to
∆c in the discrete formulation) represents the marginal beneﬁt.
Note that, with psychological payoﬀs, we have a ”continuum” of equilib-
rium eﬀort levels em ≤ e∗ ≤ e, each of which constitutes a strict equilibrium
(an equilibrium where unilateral deviation strictly decreases one’s payoﬀ).
Hence the traditional reﬁnements concepts, such as perfectness, properness,
or strategic stability, cannot tell which of them are most likely. We argue
that the long run stochastic stability (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob [15] and
Young [24]) is a natural concept to address stability of equilibrium in this
model. Also note that the smallest morale equilibrium eﬀort level corre-
sponds to the ”material” Nash equilibrium. Morale equilibrium eﬀort level
cannot be smaller, as providing more eﬀort than the norm entails no psycho-
logical cost: at e<e m, players want to increase their eﬀorts. The maximum
morale equilibrium eﬀort level, e, may be greater or smaller than the eﬃcient
eﬀort level e+, which maximizes the total material payoﬀ
PN
i=1 (Nei − c(ei)).
The ”ﬁrst order condition” is ∆c(e+) <N<∆c(e+ +1 ) . Comparing this
with condition (3), we have:
Proposition 2 The eﬃcient eﬀort level is attained iﬀ N ≤ 1+K(0).
This is the ﬁrst important property of norms and morale as resource
allocation devices; their eﬀectiveness depends on the relative strength of
the psychological and material payoﬀs. The psychological factors can be
potentially eﬀective, if the material payoﬀ is not overwhelming. In the
next section, however, we show that high equilibrium norms and morale are
dynamically unstable and identify what is sustainable in the long run. This
is the second important property of norms and morale in resource allocation
problems.
3 The Dynamics of Norms and Eﬀorts




ej(t) − c(ei(t)) − k(t)[m(t) − ei(t)]+,
8where





[m(t) − ei(t − 1)]+
!
.( 8 )
( W ea s s u m et h a tm(0) and k(0) are exogenously given.) In each period,
each player maximizes the above payoﬀ with probability 1 − ²,a n dw i t h
probability ² he takes any eﬀort level with equal probability. The latter
eventuality is called mutation,a n d² is referred to as the mutation rate.T h i s
deﬁn e saM a r k o vc h a i nw i t haﬁnite state space where the state represents
the current eﬀort proﬁle e(t).
Let us now consider the dynamic without mutation. At each time t,
each player i maximizes
vt(ei) ≡ ei − c(ei) − k(t)[m(t) − ei]+.
As players maximizes the same function vt,t h es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle at t is sym-
metric for any given e(t − 1). (Recall that we have assumed the unique
maximizer of vt, thanks to the Assumption.) Given any proﬁle e(t−1),l e t
us examine how the symmetric eﬀort level e at time t is determined. (Case
1: m(t) <e m) I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ep l a y e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ is maximized at e>m (t).
As only the material payoﬀ matters for e>m (t), we reach the material
Nash equilibrium e = em.( C a s e 2 : m(t) ≥ em)E ﬀort level e is equal to
m(t),w h e n∆c(m(t)) < 1+k(t), as a downward deviation from the present
norm m(t) does not pay. Otherwise deviation e<m (t) is beneﬁcial and the
optimal level of deviation is determined by ∆c(e) < 1+k(t) < ∆c(e +1 ) .
In any case, the new eﬀort level e constitutes a morale equilibrium: As
0 ≤ k(t) ≤ K(0), e satisﬁes equilibrium conditions (5) and (6). We sum-
marize what we have obtained as follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose mutation rate ε is equal to 0. Given any e(t−1),
m(t),a n dk(t),i nt h en e x tp e r i o dt players choose a morale equilibrium
eﬀort level e(t), which is given as follows.
(Case 1) m(t) <e m: e(t)=em.
(Case 2) m(t) >e m:I f ∆c(m(t)) < 1+k(t),t h e ne(t)=m(t).O t h e r -
wise e(t) <m (t) and it is uniquely determined by
∆c(e(t)) < 1+k(t) < ∆c(e(t)+1 ) .
9Hence, the dynamics without mutation works as follows. If the median
eﬀort is lower than the material Nash eﬀort em, then the material Nash
equilibrium arises. Otherwise, the players reach a morale equilibrium whose
eﬀort level is smaller than or equal to the current median eﬀort. This in
particular implies that process without mutation always ends up with a
morale equilibrium, which is formally stated as follows. (Recall that a limit
set is an absorbing set of states under no mutation9.)
Corollary 1 Each morale equilibrium constitutes a limit set as a single-
ton, and there is no other limit set; the family of limit sets is {{e}|e =
(e,...,e),e∈ E}.
If random shocks (mutations) are present (i.e., if the mutation rate ²
is positive), at each moment of time, each state is realized with a positive
probability, and it is known that in such a case there is a unique stationary
distribution, denoted µ(²). It represents the relative frequencies of states
in the long run and is independent of the initial state. The support of
µ∗ =l i m ²→0 µ(²) is called the set of long run stochastically stable (LSS)
states10, and this is the set of states on which the system spends most of
time in the long run, when the mutation rate is small but strictly positive.
It is known that the set of LSS states corresponds to a collection of limit
sets, and we call such a limit set (a limit set in the support of µ∗) a LSS limit
set. We now identify the LSS limit sets by the transition tree technique
developed by Freidlin and Wentzell [11], Kandori, Mailath, and Rob [15] and
Young [24]. This approach considers trees deﬁned on the family of limit
sets and associated cost, and shows that the root of a minimum cost tree
corresponds to a LSS limit set.
A transition tree is a directed graph, the set of whose nodes is equal to
the family of all limit sets. Formally, it is a collection of directed branches
between limit sets, where (i) there is one node, called the root, without an
outgoing branch and (ii) any other node has a single outgoing branch, and
(iii) there is no closed loop. Given Corollary 1, we abuse notation to say the
”branch from e to e0” when we mean the ”branch from limit set {e} to {e0}”,
where e =( e,...,e) and e0 =( e0,...,e 0) are (symmetric) equilibria. We also
say ”morale equilibrium” or ”state” e when we mean morale equilibrium or
state e =( e,...,e). With this convention in mind, we now identify the cost
9A set of states is a limit set if, under no mutation, (i) any two states in the set are
mutually reachable (within a ﬁnite period) and (ii) no outside state is reachable from the
states within the set.
10We follow this terminology proposed by Ellison [7].
10of transition from equilibrium e to equilibrium e0, denoted by C(e,e0).L e t
(e0,e1,...,eT) be a path in the state space from equilibrium e0 =( e,...,e)
to another equilibrium eT =( e0,...,e 0). Note that the intermediate states in
the path et (0 <t<T) do not have to be equilibria. Let c(et−1,et) be the
cost of transition (the number of required mutations) from state et−1 to et,





where the minimum is taken over all paths (e0,e1,...,eT) such that e0 =
(e,...,e) and eT =( e0,...,e 0), for any T =1 ,2,3,.... The cost of a tree is the
sum of the cost of branches, where the cost of branch from e to e0 is deﬁned
by (9). The Freidlin-Wentzell transition tree analysis shows that a limit set
is LSS if and only if it is the root of a minimum cost transition tree.
Now we determine the costs of ”upward” transitions (from e to e0 >e ).
In what follows the proofs of lemmas are given in the Appendix. First, let
us show that upward transition requires that a majority (more than N/2)
of players mutate. Recall that the number of players N is odd, so that N/2
is not an integer.
Lemma 1 For any pair of morale equilibria e<e 0, we have C(e,e0) >N / 2.
The next lemma (and its proof) shows that equilibrium eﬀort can ”creep
up” if more than the half of the players exert slightly more eﬀort, provided
that original eﬀort level is less than a certain threshold (denoted eU). Recall
again that N+1
2 i st h es m a l l e s ti n t e g e rw h i c hi sm o r et h a nN
2 ,a sw ea s s u m e
that N is odd.
Lemma 2 C(e,e+1)= N+1
2 if em ≤ e<e U,w h e r eeU i st h eu n i q u em o r a l e




) < ∆c(eU +1 ) .
Note that eU is close to the maximum equilibrium eﬀort level e,w h e n
t h eg r i ds i z ef o rt h ee ﬀort level is suﬃciently ﬁne:
Remark 1 If we introduce the grid size δ for eﬀort level and suppose e ∈
{0,δ,2δ,3δ,...}, eU is deﬁned by ∆c(eU) < 1+K(N−1
2 δ) < ∆c(eU +1).A s
the largest equilibrium eﬀort e is deﬁned by condition (3) ∆c(e) < 1+K(0) <
∆c(e +1 ) , we have
eU → e, as the grid size for eﬀort δ → 0.
11Next we turn to identify the costs of ”downward” transitions (from e to






This condition represents the incentives of the players when a minority of
players shirk in the most eﬀective way: i.e. when N−1
2 players deviate to
0. If this condition is satisﬁed, in the next period, everyone goes back to
eD, as the marginal beneﬁt of reducing eﬀort from eD (the left hand side)
is smaller than the marginal cost (the right hand side). Hence eD is the
maximum equilibrium eﬀort level that cannot be ”pulled down” unless more
than the half of the players reduce their eﬀorts. This turns out to be the
maximum eﬀort level sustainable in the long run; Theorem 1 below shows
that the eﬀort level between em and eD are long run stochastically stable.
By the deﬁnitions it is easy to see
em ≤ eD ≤ eU ≤ e.
Let us examine when the range of the long run sustainable eﬀort levels is
non-degenerate (in other words, when we have strict inequality em <e D).
As the material payoﬀ is concave, a small deviation from the material Nash
equilibrium entails minute cost, as Akerlof and Yellen [1] stressed. Hence
t h e r ei sar a n g eo fe ﬀort levels near the material Nash equilibrium, which
are sustained by a modest binding power of the norm. The range is large
when the material payoﬀ is relatively ﬂat near the equilibrium. Formally,
recall that em is deﬁned by ∆c(em) < 1 < ∆c(em +1 ) , and note that
∆c(em) ∼ = 1 ∼ = ∆c(em+1)w h e nt h eg r i ds i z ef o rt h ee ﬀort level is suﬃciently
ﬁne. In contrast, K(N−1
2 (em +1 ) )does not vanish as the grid size tends
t oz e r o ,s ot h a tw eh a v e∆c(em +1 )< 1+K(N−1
2 (em +1 ) ) . This means
that em <e D w h e nt h eg r i ds i z ei sﬁne, as eD is the maximum eﬀort level
satisfying ∆c(e) < 1+K(N−1
2 e). Furthermore, if the material payoﬀ is
relatively ﬂat at the material Nash equilibrium, ∆c(e) < 1+K(N−1
2 e) is
satisﬁed for a wide range of e, and therefore the set of LSS eﬀort level
{e|em ≤ e ≤ eD} can be large. The next lemma brieﬂy summarizes the
above discussion.
Lemma 3 em <e D if 1+K(N−1
2 (em +1 ) )> ∆c(em +1 ) .O t h e r w i s e ,
em = eD.
The next lemma formally shows that any morale equilibrium e>e D can
be ”pulled down” when less than the half of the players shirk.
12Lemma 4 For any morale equilibrium e>e D, there is a morale equilibrium
e0 <esuch that C(e,e0) <N / 2.
Although the above lemma is enough to prove our main result (Theorem
1 below), we can obtain a sharper characterization of the downwards costs,
which helps to understand the nature of the dynamics.
Deﬁnition 2 For n =1 ,2,...,N−1
2 ,d e ﬁne eﬀort level en to be the maximum
eﬀort level e satisfying
∆c(e) < 1+K(ne).
As ∆c is increasing and K is decreasing, en is non-increasing in n,a n d
note that e
N−1
2 is equal to eD;
eD = e
N−1
2 ≤ ···≤ e2 ≤ e1.
Note that en is the maximum eﬀort level that cannot be pulled down unless
(strictly) more than n players shirk (exert zero eﬀort). The reasoning is
parallel to our discussion on eD.T h o s e e ﬀort levels are (approximately)
given as in Figure 2, where we again assume for simplicity that e were a
continuous variable so that c0 in the ﬁgure plays the role of ∆c.F r o m F i g u r e
2w ec a ns e et h a tt h ea b o v ei n e q u a l i t i e sa r es t r i c tw h e nt h eg r i ds i z eo ne ﬀort
level (normalized as 1 in the current formulation) is suﬃciently small. The
next lemma provides the exact characterization of the downwards costs for
e>e D (here e0 is deﬁned to be e for convenience).






and the minimum cost is achieved by e0 ≤ en.
In other words, the most likely downward transition from e such that
en <e≤ en−1 is to have downward mutation to zero eﬀort level by n
players, and this achieves a new equilibrium with a lower eﬀort level e0 ≤ en.
Note that, as the gain from downward deviation (∆c(e)) becomes larger as
e increases (increasing marginal cost), the current equilibrium is upset by
a small reduction of the binding power (i.e., by a relatively small number
of (downward) mutations away from the current work norm e), when e is
much larger than the material Nash eﬀort level. As e becomes smaller
and approaches the material Nash eﬀort em, in contrast, the material gain
13from downward deviation becomes smaller, as Akerlof and Yellen [1] noted.
This means that the current equilibrium is upset only when a majority of
the players shirk (in other words, only when the binding power becomes
suﬃciently small). This is the crux of the matter that determines the
dynamics of norms and morale.
Hence we have shown that for any morale equilibrium e>e D,ad o w n -
ward transition to a lower equilibrium eﬀort level is possible when less than
the half of the players shirk (i.e., with transition cost less than N/2). The
next lemma shows that, for morale equilibrium e ≤ eD, the cost of a down-
ward transition is always equal to N+1
2 .
Lemma 6 For any pair of morale equilibria e and e0 such that e0 <e≤ eD,
we have C(e,e0)=N+1
2 .
Let us summarize in the following table the most likely transition from
each state e, denoted by e0 (e0 ∈Arg mine06=e C(e,e0)), and its associated cost
(mine06=e C(e,e0)). This is obtained by the above Lemmas. In the table, it
should be understood that em ≤ e0.N o t e t h a t e is displayed (from left to
right) in the increasing order. (Hence, for example, the rightmost column
indicates that the most likely transition from any state e1 <e≤ e is to
move towards e0 ≤ e1, with associated cost 1.)
e em ········· eD ··· e
N−1
2 −1 ··· ···e2 ···e1 ···e
e0 e +1or11
any e0 <e




2 ··· 3 2 1
Note that the states in
E∗ ≡ {e|em ≤ e ≤ eD} (11)
are mutually reachable with cost N+1
2 , and also note that this is the min-
imum cost of transition from each state in this set. We are now ready to
state our main result; this ”component” E∗ corresponds to the set of the
long run stochastically stable states:
Theorem 1 The set of long run stochastically stable states is {e =( e,...,e) | em ≤
e ≤ eD}.
11There may be another e
0 ≥ e +1that achieves the minimum cost.
14Proof. By Corollary 1, we need to consider trees deﬁned over the set of
equilibria. Note that the following is true. For each node (equilibrium),
endow an outgoing branch with the minimum cost, and then from the re-
sulting graph delete a branch with the largest cost. If we obtain a tree,
then it is a minimum cost tree. Let us ﬁrst prove this assertion. Deﬁne,




and also deﬁne c∗∗ =m i n e∈E c∗(e). Take any tree and let us denote its
root by e0. Its cost is at least
P
e∈E c∗(e) − c∗(e0) ≥
P
e∈E c∗(e) − c∗∗,t h e
cost of the tree constructed by the above procedure. Hence our assertion
is proved. Let us now turn to the proof of the Theorem. Note ﬁrst the
following characterization of the minimum cost outgoing branches. (In
what follows e and e0 should be understood as equilibrium eﬀort levels)
For e>e D,w ec a nﬁnd n<N / 2 such that en <e≤ en−1, and we have
c∗(e)=C(e,en)=n<N / 2 (by Lemmas 1 and 5). For e ≤ eD, c∗(e)=N+1
2
and c∗(e)=C(e,e0) if e0 <eor e0 = e +1(by Lemmas 1,2, and 6). Then,
we can construct a minimum cost tree whose root is any element e” in E∗
as follows. In the ﬁrst step choose the minimum cost branches in E∗ as
em → em +1→ ···→ e” − 1 ¿ e” ← ···← eD.
For e/ ∈ E∗, (by Lemma 4) we can choose a minimum cost outgoing branch
(e,e0) such that e0 <ewith cost less than N
2 . Then delete the outgoing
branch from e”, which has the maximum cost N+1
2 .T h e r e s u l t i s a t r e e
with root e”, because for each e/ ∈ E∗, there is a path leading to E∗.F r o m
the above assertion this must be a minimum cost tree, and we conclude
that any e” ∈ E∗ is a long run stochastically stable state. Note that the
minimized cost of trees is equal to
P
e∈E c∗(e) − N+1
2 . Furthermore, there
is no minimum cost tree whose root is e” ∈ EÂE∗. If so, the cost of the





2 , a contradiction.
The minimum cost tree constructed in the above proof and the above
table suggest that the eﬀorts gradually decay until the long run stochastically
stable set E∗ is reached, and in the (very) long run the eﬀorts drift in this
set. Simulation results conﬁrm this observation. Figure 3 presents a sample
path for a particular stage game, with 7 players and mutation rate ² =0 .15.
The LSS set E∗ corresponds to the eﬀort levels between 40 and 53,w h i l e
the maximum equilibrium eﬀort level is e =8 0 . The median eﬀort (the
norm) gradually erodes until it hits the LSS set. Note that the erosion is
15relatively quick. Figure 4 shows another sample path of the same model for
a much longer time span. The median eﬀo r tm a i n l yd r i f t si nt h eL S Ss e t .
A higher norm occasionally emerges, but it quickly erode until the LSS set
is reached again.
4W a i t i n g T i m e s
Let En = {e|em ≤ e ≤ en} for n =1 ,2,...,N−1
2 .W e n o w e x a m i n e t h e
expected time to reach this set of equilibrium eﬀort levels. Note that En
coincides with the set of the LSS states when n = N−1
2 . This issue can be
addressed by the notion of the radius and the modiﬁed coradius,p o w e r f u l
analytical tools developed by Ellison [7]. Here, we present a simpler, self-
contained analysis, which is possible due to the special structure of the
dynamics. In particular, the following fact greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
From Proposition 3, we know that from any state e, an equilibrium e0 is
reached within one period, if there is no mutation. Suppose that players
1 and 2 mutate to e1 and e2, when the current state is e.T h e s t a t e i n
t h en e x tp e r i o di s(e1,e 2,e 0,...,e 0). The same state is obtained by the
same eventuality if the current state were e0. This observation shows the
following lemma, where the one period transition probability from state e
to e0 is denoted by p²(e,e0).
Lemma 7 For any state e,l e te0 be the equilibrium reached in the next
period without mutation. Then, for any state e0, p²(e,e0)=p²(e0,e0).
This lemma shows that it is suﬃcient to consider transitions from equilib-
ria. The proof of Lemma 5 shows that, from any morale equilibrium e/ ∈ En,
an equilibrium e0 ≤ en (hence En)i sa c h i e v e di fn players mutate to zero
eﬀort. Now let Dn be the set of states from which En is achieved with prob-
ability one, in the absence of mutation (the basin of attraction of En)a n d
let ∼Dn denote its complement. Lemma 7 implies that, to identify a lower
bound of the one period transition probabilities form the states in ∼Dn to the
set Dn, we only need to consider the transition probabilities from the equi-
libria in ∼Dn (i.e., e/ ∈ En). The above argument shows that the probability
that n players mutate to zero eﬀort, denoted by p, serves as a lower bound12.
Replace the one period transition probabilities from ∼Dn to Dn with their
lower bound p, and calculate the expected waiting time to reach from ∼Dn
12The probability of reaching E
n from e/ ∈ E
n in one period is larger than p, because
having n m u t a t i o n st oz e r oi sn o tt h eo n l yw a yo fr e a c h i n gE
n.
16to Dn, and denote it by W. (Note that, by construction, W is longer than
the true waiting time.) Then, W satisﬁes W = p × 1+( 1− p)(1 + W),o r
W =1 /p.A s p = An²n + An+1²n+1 + ···+ AN²N, an upper bound of the
expected waiting time to reach En is given by, for small enough ²,
W<A ² −n,
for some constant A>013. This shows that, for small n, En is reached
within a reasonable amount of time.
Let us now identify a lower bound of the expected waiting time to escape
from En (n>1). For each state e ∈ Dn,l e tq(e) be the probability
of escaping from Dn in one period. Lemma 1 shows that to reach an
equilibrium e0 / ∈ En from e ∈ En, it takes at least N+1
2 mutations. This
means that, when e ∈ En,f o rs u ﬃciently small ², q(e) ≤ B²
N+1
2 for some
constant B>014. Lemma 7 implies that this is also true for all e ∈ Dn.
Hence, if we suppose that the one period probability of escaping Dn were
equal to its upper bound B²
N+1
2 for all e ∈ Dn, the resulting expected
waiting time, denoted W0, is shorter than the true expected waiting time.
As we have W0 = B²
N+1
2 × 1+( 1− B²
N+1
2 )(1 + W0), a lower bound of the
expected waiting time to escape form Dn is given by
W0 = A0²−N+1
2 ,
for A0 =1 /B > 0. Let us now summarize what we have obtained. Recall
that Dn is the basin of attraction of En, the interval of eﬀort level between
the material Nash eﬀort em and en,a n d∼Dn is its complement. The
”threshold” eﬀort levels en for n =1 ,2,...N−1
2 are determined as in Figure
2, where em ≤ eD = e
N−1
2 ≤ ···≤ e2 ≤ e1. Also recall that D
N−1
2 coincides
with the basin of attraction of the LSS states.
Theorem 2 Let W(e,X,²) be the expected waiting time to reach a set of
states X from state e. Then, there are constants A,A0 > 0 such that, for
all suﬃciently small ²,( i )W(e,Dn,²) ≤ A²−n for all e ∈∼Dn, and (ii)
W(e,∼Dn,²) ≥ A0²−N+1
2 for all e ∈ Dn.
13Choose A such that AAn > 1.T h e n ,
A²−n
W → AAn > 1,a s² → 0.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
W<A ²
−n for small enough ².
14As escaping from D
n requires mutations more than or equal to
N+1





k,w h e r eBk(e) ≥ 0.C h o o s e B such that B>B N+1
2















17Ac o u p l eo fr e m a r k sa r ei no r d e r . F i r s t ,w eh a v ee s s e n t i a l l yt h es a m e
waiting times if we replace Dn and ∼Dn with En and EÂEn. T h i si sb e -
cause once DnÂEn is reached, En is reached in the next period (Proposition
3). Hence W(e,En,²) ≤ W(e,Dn,²)+1 ,a n ds i m i l a r l y ,W(e,EÂEn,²) ≤
W(e,∼Dn,²)+1 . Secondly, and most importantly, the above Proposition
indicates that eﬀorts typically erode over time. It shows that the waiting
time to reach En is in the order of ²−n, while escaping En requires waiting
time in the order of ²−N+1
2 .A s n<N+1
2 , the latter is much longer than the
former, for a small15 ². For example, suppose we have seven players and
² =0 .1. If we start with the maximum morale equilibrium e, the waiting
t i m et or e a c ha ne ﬀort level lower than e1 (or e2) is in the order of ²−1 =1 0
(or ²−2 = 100), but coming back requires a fairly large amount of time in
the order of ²−4 =1 0 ,000. This means that the system gradually climbs
down the ladder of equilibrium eﬀort levels, and it is an example of what
Ellison [7] called ”step-by-step evolution”. Such eﬀects are observed in the
simulation results in Figures 3 and 4. Third, as E
N−1
2 coincides with the
LSS equilibria, the LSS may not be reached within a reasonable time span,
when N is large (the waiting time is in the order of ²−N−1
2 ). However, our
argument above shows that we do observe the eﬀects of stochastic evolution;
eﬀort levels gradually erode, although they may not completely be reduced
to the LSS eﬀort levels in the relevant time span.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this section, we discuss related literature and provide a couple of re-
marks, some of which are highly speculative. The social dilemma game
with norms and morale bears some similarity to the minimum eﬀort game,
in which player i’s payoﬀ is given by min{e1,...,e N} − cei,w i t h0 <c<1.
Any symmetric eﬀort proﬁle is an equilibrium in this game. Van Huyck,
Battalio, and Beil [22] reported experimental results showing that, with a
large N,e ﬀort level converges to its minimum level (0). Their 1991 pa-
per [23] considered the median game, where player i’s payoﬀ is given by
m − b(m − ei)2,w h e r em is the median of {e1,...,e N}. They found that
the subjects invariably converge to the equilibrium determined by the ini-
tial median. Note that, unlike our model, the median always has the same
15The two quantities n and
N+1
2 correspond to the modiﬁed coradius and the radius
of D
n, and Ellison’s theorem [7] shows that the LSS states are contained in E
n,a st h e
former is less than the latter, for each n =1 ,...,
N−1
2 . Our analysis in the previous section
shows that all states in E
N−1
2 = E
∗ are in fact LSS states.
18”binding power” b in their model, and there is no incentive to reduce ei,e v e n
if the binding power b is equal to zero. Hence no erosion is likely to happen
in their game. Crawford [5] presented a model with adaptive expectations
of the minimum or median in those experiments to conduct econometric
analysis. Anderson, Goeree, and Holt [2] and [3] presented a stochastic
dynamic model for the minimum eﬀort game and showed that a particular
equilibrium is selected in the long run. Unlike our model, they postulate
that (i) players rationally expects the current minimum eﬀort distribution
and (ii) the adjustment dynamic is in continuous time and subject to the
shocks represented by a Brownian motion. Note that, in all of the works
cited above, the material payoﬀ itself has the coordination game structure,
while in our model such a structure arises via the interaction of material and
psychological payoﬀs. Isaac, Walker, and Williams [14] conjectured that,
in their experiments where contributions to public good declined over time,
the subjects maintained some cooperation as long as the current payoﬀ is
expected to be higher than the material Nash payoﬀ, but no formal dynamic
model was presented.
The dynamics of norms and standards have been explored in somewhat
diﬀerent contexts by Ellison [8], [9], and Sobel [21]. Ellison [8] provided
detailed accounts for the slowdown of academic publishing16.I n t h e c o m -
panion paper [9] he considered a model where academic authors have two
tasks, developing a new idea and its execution, the latter of which is rele-
vant for the revision of a paper. The model shows that over time authors
gradually put more eﬀorts for revision, because of the persistent small mis-
perception caused by the overconﬁdence in one’s own work. Sobel [21]
considered generations of players who wish to join a club. Each player
exerts a multi-dimensional eﬀort vector, whose components are aggregated
into a one-dimensional performance index. One is accepted to the club if he
is comparable to the current members, in terms of the index. Sobel showed
quite generally that the ﬂuctuations of the weights to compose the index
result in declining standards. The multi-dimensional nature of eﬀort is es-
sential in those works, while our model is built on one-dimensional eﬀort,
where the reciprocal nature of altruism plays a major role.
N o ww et u r nt os o m er e m a r k s .
1. Strategic Placement of Highly Motivated Workers: Relative
strength of the material and psychological payoﬀs may vary across players.
16 His empirical paper [8] indicates that a substantial part of the slowdown is caused
by extensive revisions, and the delay of referee’s reports accounts for a quarter of the
slowdown. His model [9] sheds light on the former, while our work might be relevant for
the latter.
19Suppose that a ﬁrm consists of two factories, each of which is represented
by our model with seven workers. Among the fourteen workers in the ﬁrm,
six of them are highly motivated in the sense that they put higher weights
on the psychological payoﬀs. In particular, assume that their weights of
psychological payoﬀs are so high that they are willing to observe the norm,
as long as a majority of fellow workers do so. Also suppose that this is
the case even under random shocks (so that they do not mutate). How
should one allocate the six good citizens? If we split them equally to each
factory, a majority of workers in each factory behave as in our model. Then,
the transition costs in Section 3 and the order of waiting times in Section
4 are unaﬀected, as they involve mutations by less than the half of the
players. This means that the basic properties of the dynamics of norms
and morale are unaﬀected, unless we change the behavior of a majority of
players. Hence, the norm in each factory erodes in a similar way to our
model, although the erosion is somewhat slower. In particular, eﬀort level
falls below e3 in both factories in the long run. On the other hand, if we
place all the six good citizens in one factory, we can sustain in that factory
the maximum equilibrium eﬀort level e.
The past two decades witnessed the rigorous theoretical analysis of or-
ganizational design, based on game theory and economics of information.
Material incentives are the key elements in such an approach, but we are
left with the feeling that there are something other than incentives that
matter in organization. The above tentative analysis suggests that taking
psychological factors into consideration could be a fruitful way to go one
step further. However, a caution is in order. Recently, a variety of anom-
alous behavior rules have been justiﬁed as stylized facts and introduced to
economic analysis. We have to be cautious, however, to derive policy impli-
cations, unless we have enough information about the postulated behavioral
rules. Recall that the early macro policy based on the stability of the
Phillips curve, which was once conceived as a reliable stylized fact, spelled
disaster. To derive dependable policy implications, we have to dig deeper
into the black box of the anomalous behavior, as Rubinstein [20] argues.
2. A Catch in Economic Transition: Consider the situation where
the present system sustains a certain payoﬀ level, and suppose a new sys-
tem, which is characterized by our social dilemma game, is proposed as an
alternative, with the initial equilibrium eﬀort being e.I f e induces a higher
payoﬀ than the status quo, people may adopt the new system, expecting
that e is going to prevail. However, a gradual erosion may lead to a worse
outcome than the status quo. To assess the merit of economic transition,
one has to consider what is sustainable in the long run, where material
20payoﬀs play a larger role.
3. Diversity near the Neoclassical Equilibrium: Our analysis
shows that a certain range of eﬀort levels can be sustained in the long run.
As our simulation result (Figure 4) illustrates, the median eﬀo r t( t h ew o r k
norm) changes in this range every once in a while. It is known that the
relative frequencies of the norms in this time series data must coincide with
those in the cross section data in the long run, as our system is ergodic.
Hence, in our formulation, diﬀerent organizations with the same material
payoﬀ structure typically exhibit diﬀerent work norms, which persists for
a long time. This happens in the vicinity of the Neoclassical equilibrium
(i.e., the Nash equilibrium with respect to the material payoﬀs), where a
small change of eﬀorts entails a minute cost. Akerlof and Yellen [1] stressed
that small deviations from optimization behavior can potentially explain a
v a r i e t yo fs t y l i z e df a c t s . O u rm o d e li si nl i n ew i t ht h i sr e s e a r c hp r o g r a m ,
and it provides new insights into the diversity of performances of diﬀerent
organizations and economies.
Appendix
We present the proofs of the Lemmas here.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :We suppose C(e,e0) <N / 2 and show that this
leads to a contradiction. Let (e0,e1,...,eT) be the minimum cost path which
achieves C(e,e0) and let met be the median eﬀort level at et.L e t BR(et)
be the (identical) eﬀort level each player would exert under no mutation
when previous state was et. Proposition 3 shows how it is determined.
We claim met+1 = BR(et).N o t e t h a t C(e,e0) <N / 2 implies that less
than the half of the population mutate in the transition from et to et+1
(i.e., c(et,et+1) <N / 2). Hence, by Proposition 3, more than half of the
population must be playing BR(et) at et+1, so that the median eﬀort level at
et+1 is equal to BR(et),a sc l a i m e d . W en o t et h a tf o ra l lt =0 ,...,T, met is a
morale equilibrium eﬀort level. The reason is twofold; (i) met = BR(et−1),
for t =1 ,...,T and BR(et−1) is always a morale equilibrium eﬀort level
(by Proposition 3), and (ii) m0 = e is a morale equilibrium eﬀort level by
deﬁnition. Hence met ≥ em,a sem is the smallest morale equilibrium eﬀort.
Therefore, Case 2 of Proposition 3 applies and we have met ≥ BR(et).T h i s
and the former claim shows e = me0 ≥ me1 ≥ ... ≥ meT = e0,w h i c h
contradicts e<e 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :Suppose that, at equilibrium e, N+1
2 players’ eﬀort
levels mutate towards e +1 . The median eﬀort in the new state is e +1 ,
21and the N−1
2 non-mutants are deviating downwards (by 1)f r o mt h i sn e w
norm. Hence the binding power of the new norm is K(N−1
2 ×1).B y C a s e
2i nP r o p o s i t i o n3a n d∆c(e) < ∆c(eU) < 1+K(N−1
2 ) (recall that ∆c is
increasing), in the following period equilibrium e+1is achieved. By Lemma
1, this is the minimum cost path.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :We show that there is a path from e to e0 with
cost less than N/2.L e t c be the minimum integer satisfying
∆c(e) > 1+K(ce)
By the deﬁnition of eD,w em u s th a v e 17 ∆c(e) > 1+K(N−1
2 e) for any
eD <e .A s K is decreasing, we have c ≤ N−1
2 (<N / 2). Now suppose
that, at equilibrium e, c players mutate into eﬀort level 0.A s c<N / 2,
the median at the new state remains to be e, so that the sum of downward
deviations is equal to ce. Then, the displayed inequality above and Case 2
of Proposition 3 show that in the following state all players take a morale
equilibrium action e0 <e . As the cost of this path is equal to c,w eh a v e
C(e,e0) ≤ c<N / 2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :Suppose n players mutate to zero eﬀort. In the
next period, all players choose eﬀort level e0 deﬁned by
∆c(e0) < 1+K(ne) < ∆c(e0 +1 ) .
(See Case 2 of Proposition 3.) As en is deﬁned to be the maximum eﬀort
level satisfying ∆c(e) < 1+K(ne),w em u s th a v e
∆c(en +1 )≥ 1+K(n(en +1 ) ) .
As e ≥ en +1and K(·) is decreasing, we have
∆c(en +1 )≥ 1+K(n(en +1 ) )≥ 1+K(ne) > ∆c(e0).
Since ∆c is increasing, we conclude en +1>e 0, or equivalently, en ≥ e0.
Hence e0 ≤ en is achieved with cost n.A s n<N / 2, there is no upward
transition with the same cost (Lemma 1). Suppose there is e0 <esuch
that C(e,e0) <n . This leads us to a contradiction. Let (e0,...,eT) be
the minimum cost path which achieves C(e,e0) and let met be the median
eﬀort level at et.L e t BR(et) be the best reply eﬀort level to et.A s




22C(e,e0) <n<N / 2 implies that a majority of players are always taking the
best reply to the previous state, we have met+1 = BR(et), as in the proof
of Lemma 1. Now we argue met = e for all t =0 ,...,T. (This contradicts
the requirement meT = e0 <e .) The claim is shown by induction. As
the claim is true for t =0by deﬁnition (me0 = e), let us suppose met = e
is true and show met+1 = e, for any t =0 ,...,T − 1. The norm at t +1 ,
deﬁned to be met,i se q u a lt oe by the induction hypothesis. We now show
that the binding power of this norm is suﬃciently strong to deter deviations.
Recall that c(et,et+1) is the number of mutations in the transition from et
to et+1 and c(et,et+1) ≤ n − 1 (as c(et,et+1) ≤ C(e,e0) <n ). Note that
the sum of downward deviations from the norm at t is maximized (and
therefore the binding power is the weakest) when the mutants take eﬀort
level 0, and the maximum total downward deviation is equal to c(et,et+1)
(the number of mutants) times (e − 0) (the maximum deviation). Hence,
if we denote the binding power of the current norm e by kt+1,w eh a v e
kt+1 ≥ K(c(et,et+1)e),a sK is decreasing. By the deﬁnition of en−1 (see
Deﬁnition 2) and e ≤ en−1, together with c(et,et+1) ≤ n − 1 and the fact
that ∆c is increasing and K is decreasing, we have ∆c(e) ≤ ∆c(en−1) <
1+K((n − 1)en−1) ≤ 1+K(c(et,et+1)e) ≤ 1+kt+1,o r
∆c(e) < 1+kt+1.
Case 2 in Proposition 3 then shows that BR(et)=e.A s w e h a v e s h o w n
met+1 = BR(et), the proof by induction is completed.
Proof of Lemma 6: The proof consists of two parts. First we prove
C(e,e0) ≥ N+1
2 , and then we show that generally for any e0 <e(e does not
have to be less than or equal to eD) there is a path from e to e0 with cost
N+1
2 .
Suppose, on the contrary, C(e,e0) <N / 2. This leads to a contradiction.
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5 and therefore omitted. Now
suppose, at equilibrium e, N+1
2 players mutate into a lower equilibrium eﬀort
level e0 <e . Then, at the new state, the median eﬀort is e0, and there is no
downward deviation from e0. Hence the best reply at this state is equal to
the best reply at equilibrium e0 (as each player maximizes (4) with m(t)=e0
and k(t)=K(0) both at this state and at equilibrium e0.). Therefore, in
the following state all players take eﬀort level e0. The cost of this path from
e to e0 is equal to N+1
2 .
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